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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Environmental Law and Justice Clinic of the Golden Gate University School 
of Law submits these comments to NA VFAC' s Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation 
Work Plan, Former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. San Francisco, Cal(fornia, June 2018 
("Draft P lan"), on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice and its 
members and constituents in Bayview Hunters Point, San Francisco and throughout 
California . 
We are disappointed, to say the very least, with the Draft Plan, which 
demonstrates that the Navy has learned little during its six-year journey from denying the 
scope of Tetra Tech ' s fraud to reluctant acceptance that all Tetra Tech's work must be 
redone. In 2012, when the Navy learned of Tetra Tech's fraud , the Navy did nothing 
meaningful to discover the extent and depth of the fraud ; and this Draft Plan again shows 
the Navy contemplates no changes to business-as-usual- that is, what got them into the 
Tetra Tech mess in the first place. The Navy claims it wants to repair its badly battered 
relationship with the community, but in practice it continues to take actions, like this Draft 
Plan, that can only further erode trust. 
The Parcel G Work Plan is not a good-faith effort to investigate radiological 
contamination. Rather, it relies on untrue assumptions, weakens cleanup standards and 
withholds crucial information on which it is based, apparently in a multi-pronged effort to 
justify minimizing the cleanup despite the massive fraud. 
We urge the Navy to go back to the drawing board and come up with a realistic 
plan to resample all of Tetra Tech's work- to start over- as the fraudulent data requires 
and as the Navy promised. And we urge the regulators to reject this Draft Plan as 
inadequate. 
II. PROCEDURAL COMMENTS 
A. The Public Comment Period Cannot Close Until at Least 30 Days 
After the Navy Makes Available All Documents on Which the Draft 
Plan Relies 
Documents that are essential to understanding the Draft Plan are being withheld 
by the Navy. As the Draft Plan concedes, "The activities presented in this work plan will 
be conducted in accordance with this work plan, a separate sampling and analysis plan 
(SAP), and a separate accident prevention plan/site safety and health plan (APP/SSHP). 
The SAP and APP/SSHP are currently being updated for submittal following this work 
plan." (emphasis added, p. 1-1 ). 
It is astonishing these essential documents have been withheld from the Draft 
Plan. How can the public or regulators comment on a work plan calling for extensive 
sampling without the sampling plan? According to the Draft Plan, the SAP contains 
crucial information on Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC), the bedrock of 
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data validation. If the Navy has its way, this Draft Plan's comment period will end before 
the SAP, including its design for data validation, is even released. 
The Draft Plan itself demonstrates how the plan cannot be evaluated without the 
essential documents on which it relies. Although it does have a section on Radiological 
Investigation Design, for example, it leaves essential details to the SAP: "The SAP 
provides additional guidance on soil sampling, chain-of custody, laboratory analysis, and 
quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) requirements" (p. 3-4). Any "additional 
guidance" about such essential matters as sampling, chain-of-custody and QA/QC must be 
provided to fully analyze the Draft Plan. 
Similarly, the Draft Plan states, "[t]he analytical methods and the radionuclides 
being analyzed for will be presented in the SAP and are summarized in Table 3-6." (p. 3-
6) But when one looks at Table 3-6, it lists no analytical methods. Rather, the paragraph 
before the table says gamma surveys "will be performed using detector systems equipped 
with gamma spectroscopy," without identifying any such systems. The unavailable SAP 
will presumably specify which systems will be used, and will provide "additional 
guidance" on a range of important issues, specifics the public does not have access to and 
are precluded from commenting on. 
Likewise, page 3-8 of the Draft Plan states, "[t]he laboratory instruments used to 
analyze the soil samples and the associated standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
calibration, maintenance, testing, inspection, and QA/QC are discussed in the SAP." How 
can anyone comment on these topics absent filling in the blanks of how the analyses will 
be done and how QA/QC requirements will be met? 
Among other things, the Draft Plan defers to the SAPs: soil samples which "will 
be submitted to the offsite analytical analysis according to the SAP" (p.3-8); "systematic 
and bias samples will be containerized, labeled, and analyzed, as described in the SAP" 
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(p. 3-15); "soil samples will be containerized and submitted to offsite laboratory with 
appropriate chain-of custody documentation as established in the SAP" (p 3-15); "samples 
will be identified, labeled, and cataloged according to the SAP" (p. 3-19); "corrective 
action reports, data validation reports, quality assurance management reports, and 
assessment reports are discussed in the SAP" (p. 4-4). (emphasis added in each case). 
These are but a few of the details deferred, there are more examples. 
Perhaps the most important example is this: "Analytical data validation will be 
performed by an independent third party as described in the SAP. Data validation will be 
performed on all TU/SU [trench unit/survey unit] data and all RBA [reference background 
area] data" (p. 5-l). Data validation goes to the heart of proving the data aren't falsified, 
unlike in the past. It is imperative that we be given the information necessary to comment 
on the adequacy ofthe data validation plans. 
Furthermore, there is not a single separate SAP. In fact, according to email 
correspondence between counsel, there may be as many as seven SAPs, all being 
withheld, each possibly detailing a different approach to the critical subjects left to the 
SAPs. 
Greenaction's counsel have given repeated written notice to the Navy that the 
SAPs are essential to understanding and commenting on the Draft Plan and have 
repeatedly asked the Navy to supply them. To date, the Navy has refused not only to 
provide the documents, but even to indicate when they might be released. 
The Draft Plan relies on numerous other documents that are not available. For 
example, the Navy attributes its unbelievable claim that 80% ofremediated soil didn't 
really need to be remediated, to a single report by the Argonne National Laboratory, 
Radiological Waste Evaluation Associated with Various Base Realignment and Closure 
Activities (2011). This document is not available through NAVFAC's and the regulators' 
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online document repositories, nor was it readily accessible via a Google search. Hard as it 
is to believe, the Final Parcel G ROD is not available on NAVFAC's website either. Nor 
does the Navy website contain any of the five Tetra Tech documents referenced in the 
Draft Plan. Among them are the Basewide Radiation Management Plan, Feb. 3, 2012, 
which is heavily relied on by the Draft Work Plan and the Final Status Survey Results, 
Building 401, Sept. 21, 2009; that building is the proposed site of background sampling 
despite evidence of radiological impact in at least one section ofthe structure. 
As a result ofthe Navy's failure to make available documents essential to 
understanding and commenting on the Draft Plan, the Navy has failed to fulfill its public 
participation obligations; it has failed to provide "sufficient information as may be 
necessary to provide a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan and alternative 
proposals considered," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 9617.The comment period must 
therefore be extended to at least 30 days after the Navy releases all documents on which 
this Draft Plan relies. 
Til. SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS- General 
A. The Navy Must Live up to Its Repeated Promises 
The Navy has publicly and repeatedly promised it will retest rul.areas where Tetra 
Tech worked. The Draft Plan, however, contemplates no such thing. In fact, it calls for 
resampling only about one-third of the trench units and only half the Tetra Tech survey 
units: "Twenty-one of the 63 former sanitary sewer and storm drain TUs were selected for 
the Phase 1 investigation. Fourteen ofthe 28 surface soil SUs from the Buildings 
317/364/365 Former Building Site and Building 351 A Crawl Space were selected for the 
Phase 1 investigation" (p. iv). 
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This Draft Plan is in direct, irreconcilable contradiction to the Navy's public 
promises. The Draft Plan omits them despite the fact they were made at more than one 
public meeting, including a Board of Supervisor's Committee hearing. 
The Navy must explain this dramatic about-face, and it must live up to its 
promises to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. Unless it does, it is quite likely that 
excessive levels of radioactive contamination will remain at the shipyard for generations 
to come. 
B. There Are No Plans For Third Party Observation to Assure Fraud Is Not 
Repeated 
The Draft Plan ignores some history and misstates the history it addresses. 
Resampling is only being done because Tetra Tech's fraud requires that it be redone. The 
Navy spent more than a year trying to avoid having to fully redo Tetra Tech's work, 
hoping its data review could verify the bulk of Tetra Tech's data. But it did the opposite, 
actually verifying the whistleblowers' testimony. And EPA's review found about double 
the problems the data review did. Under the circumstances, the Navy had no choice but to 
finally agree to discard all Tetra Tech's data. 
Tetra Tech committed fraud. But the Navy is culpable too. It allowed the fraud to 
take place for years, right under its nose. So did the regulators. They have thus far proven 
incapable of the kind of supervision necessary to assure history does not repeat itself. 
Accordingly, the Draft Plan must contain provisions for third-parties unassociated with 
Tetra Tech or there-sampling contractor(s}, to observe and document the resampling 
activities. As detailed further below, the Draft Plan must add a "Verification 
Subcontractor" whose role will be to prevent fraud through direct observation and 
videotaping of all activities (See section IV .D.l ). 
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C. The Navy Must Address the Production Pressure Issue 
The statements ofwhistleblowers and the admissions of Tetra Tech supervisor 
Justin Hubbard, who pled guilty to federal charges, was that a primary driver of Tetra 
Tech's fraud was pressure from above to get the job done under budget and on time. 
According to these witnesses, this pressure started with the Navy, which pressured Tetra 
Tech to meet schedules despite changes of circumstances that, if handled properly, would 
have inevitably caused significant delay. In tum, Tetra Tech pressured its top onsite 
management and that burden was transmitted through Health Physicist Supervisors to the 
whistleblowers who committed the fraud. 
The fixed-price nature of the contract also created compelling incentives to cheat, 
according to witnesses. Fixed price contracts lead bidders to reduce the price as much as 
possible, and maybe even more, to provide a competitive edge. Fixed price contacts 
punish companies that find they have to do extensive work to do it right and rewards 
companies with windfall profits if they cheat and get away with it. 
The Draft Plan does not reduce or remove these negative incentives, it simply 
ignores them. The Navy should look to itself and identify any and all ways its actions 
could have provided incentives for fraud in order to prevent its recurrence. Like the 
requirement for third-party observation, the plan should acknowledge the problem, discuss 
the impact incentives may have on the execution of the work plan and describe 
appropriate steps that will be taken to minimize that impact. 
D. The Navy Must Revise the HRAs, ROD and ROCs 
The Parcel G ROD is out of date and inaccurate. It must be revised to reflect 
the actual on-the-ground post-fraud reality, particularly that improperly remediated 
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soil cleared for use as backfill, relying on fraudulent data, contaminated areas of the 
shipyard that were not previously contaminated, including in Parcel G. 
The Draft Plan relies on the Conceptual Site Model (CSM), which, in turn, 
relies on the Historical Radiological Assessments (HRAs): "The CSM is based largely 
on the Historical Radiological Assessment (NAVSEA, 2004)." 
But the HRAs are inconsistent with what we now know. The failure to include the 
most up-to-date facts renders the HRAs inaccurate and therefore misleading. For 
example, the HRAs claim Parcel A was not radiologically impacted except for one 
building that was demolished. To the contrary, we have recently brought both 
eyewitness and documentary proof to the Navy and regulators that it was 
contaminated; samples from both the former sanitary and storm water sewer systems 
revealed elevated levels of radiation that should have been investigated further but 
were not. 
Another example relates to whether uranium should be a radionuclide of 
concern (ROC). The Navy dismisses uranium as an ROC. But long-time residents who 
worked at the shipyard, or who had family members who did, have alleged for years 
that uranium was used there just as carelessly as other radionuclides. They also say 
experiments with depleted uranium took place. This information is readily available to 
the Navy, but they never sought it. Since the Navy's plan relies heavily on the 
assertion uranium is not an ROC, this potential flaw could be significant. There may 
be other ROCs that have been omitted from testing based on the inaccurate HRAs; the 
ROC issue must be revisited. 
Neither the HRAs nor the Parcel G ROD could possibly have included any 
information supplied by the whistleblowers since both documents predated them 
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coming forward. Their information must inform the radiological investigation. The 
whistleblowers uniformly state that fraudulent soil remediation resulted in potentially 
still-contaminated soil being used as backfill throughout the shipyard; this spread 
contamination to locations that were not previously impacted. Yet reliance on the 
HRAs ignores this crucial evidence as well as the rest of the untapped whistleblowers' 
knowledge that the Navy refuses to pursue. 
Furthermore there are radically different circumstances than when the Parcel G 
ROD was adopted. The most significant change has been a complete transformation in 
the intended use ofthe parcel. Until just a couple years ago, only a small comer of 
Parcel G was to be cleared for residential use. However, in 2016, after consideration of 
the Feasibility Assessment for Evaluating Areas with Residential Land Use 
Restrictions, Parcel G, Nov. 30, 2016, residential use is now permitted throughout the 
entirety of Parcel G. The implications of this change could not have been factored into 
either the ROD or the HRAs since they were written years earlier. Now that the Parcel 
G radiological work needs to be redone, it would be foolish for the Navy and 
regulators to blind themselves to the current state of reality and pretend they were 
stuck in yesterday's world. 
The HRAs and the major planning documents that rely on them, like the ROD, 
must be updated to accurately reflect the current state of knowledge about radiological 
contamination at the shipyard. Only then can cleanup planning rely on them. 
E. The Navy Is Improperly Changing Remediation Goals 
Remediation goals (RGs) are the standard used to determine if remediation is 
necessary. Generally, if a sample analysis exceeds an RG this alone is sufficient to 
determine that cleanup is required. An exception is for radium-226, which allows adding 
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background levels to the RG. We believe it is an inappropriate exception insufficiently 
justified by the Draft Plan. Incredibly, however, the Navy's lack of clarity seems to make 
the exception the rule; all ROCs will be deemed to be compliant as long as they are below 
the background radiation level PLUS the RG. 
This is suggested in Table 3-2, which lists Residential Soil Remediation Goals. 
Footnote "a" states, "All RGs will be applied as concentrations above background." 
(emphasis added.) As we note in Section III.D., virtually all of Parcel G is now approved 
for residential use. The Navy must clarify whether it intends this change and if so, go 
through the appropriate process to do so. 
F. Background Sample Locations Are Inappropriate 
The Draft Plan fails to recognize the history of blunders and fraud in sampling 
and analyzing background reference samples. According to witnesses, for years Tetra 
Tech had rad techs go to the officer's club parking lot on Parcel A to obtain 
background samples. However, witnesses say the samples were from an area that had 
extensive amounts of "black" sand, some of which contained radiological 
contamination from use for sandblasting warships used in Operation Cross Roads. 
This history call into question all background samples taken from Parcel A. Based on 
the recollections of people who worked in at the shipyard decades ago, future public 
health and safety would be better served by assuming all of the shipyard is 
radiologically impacted unless proven otherwise than by assuming the shipyard is 
clean until proven otherwise. 
Background levels should not be obtained from the shipyard because the historical 
record shows, if the Navy would only look, that there is no place on the shipyard 
which can reliably be said to have never been impacted. Rather, after geologic study, 
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backgrounds should be obtained from areas nearby that have similar stone and soil 
composition, with no radiological history. 
Furthermore, as amplified below, the proposed location of building background 
sampling is in a radiologically impacted building. There must be better choices. (See 
Section III E.) 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS - Specific 
A. The Description of the Factual Background Is False 
The Navy continues its willful blindness to the best resources available to 
pinpoint the fraud's impact on the cleanup, the whistleblowers. We have been urging 
the Navy for more than a year to interview them to help target the resampling. The 
Navy has refused, essentially saying, "It's not our job." It is the Navy's job. 
No resampling plan for Parcel G or any of the other parcels should proceed 
without prior investigation by the Navy of what former HPNS rad workers know about 
the fraud committed in that parcel. 
Furthermore, the Background section of the Executive Summary states: "An 
independent third-party evaluation of previous data found evidence of manipulation 
and falsification at Parcel G (Navy, 2017, 2018). As a result, the Navy developed this 
work plan to investigate radiological sites in Parcel G." 
This statement omits significant history. The third party evaluation did not 
arise out of nowhere; it was the Navy's response to sworn statements adduced by 
Greenaction and its counsel by former radiation workers at HPNS. They detailed their 
participation in massive radiological fraud including soil-sample tampering, fraudulent 
building scanning, data falsification and fraudulent soil remediation, among other 
11 
things. Furthermore, the Draft Plan ignores the fact that while the third-party 
evaluation identified "only" 49% of survey units (SU).with suspect data, EPA's 
review found nearly double that, an astonishing 97%! By failing to acknowledge how 
the fraud came to light, the Navy omits significant facts that should inform the plan to 
resample Tetra Tech's work. 
B. Section 1 - Introduction The Project Purpose Is Too Narrow 
In addressing background samples, the Project Purpose states, "Additional 
reference background areas will also be identified to confirm, or update as necessary, 
estimates of naturally occurring and man-made background levels for ROCs not 
attributed to Naval operations at HPNS" (p. 1-1 ). 
It purports to exclude "man-made background levels for ROCs not attributed" 
to the Navy. But it fails to define the internally contradictory term, "man-made 
background levels;" by definition, man-made background levels are not background 
levels. Nor does it provide any evidence that "man-made background levels" of 
radiation not attributable to the Navy actually exist at the shipyard. 
If what the Navy means is that it will not remediate in a manner that would 
protect public health by claiming certain existing radiation is "man-made 
background," it should admit it. If the Navy has evidence that "man-made 
background" contamination exists, it must provide it. In any case, remediation of all 
man-made radiation above cleanup levels is required. Accordingly, the Project 
Purpose should be expanded to provide a full explanation of how background levels 
will be measured, where they will come from and what impact those measurements 
will have on the cleanup. 
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C. Section 2 - The Conceptual Site Model Is Inaccurate and Out of 
Date 
a. Failure to Acknowledge the Extent of the Fraud 
Like the rest of the Draft Plan, the Conceptual Site Model consistently 
minimizes the fraud. If the Navy took the proof of fraud seriously, it could not propose 
leaving two-thirds of the trench units and one-half of the survey units completely 
untested. 
Both the Executive Summary and the body of the Draft Plan exhibit how the 
Navy consistently downplays the fraud. The Executive summary states, "[a] 
conceptual site model (CSM) was developed with current knowledge of the site." (p. i) 
This is simply untrue. As stated above, the Navy is willfully ignoring eyewitness 
testimony that has been available for over a year. The body of the Draft Plan does no 
better: "Following the investigation and removal actions, there were allegations that 
TtEC potentially manipulated and falsely represented data." (p.2-1). 
Two years ago there were "allegations." Now, taking the affidavits of the 
whistleblowers and the results of the Navy's data review (which was intended to 
validate Tetra Tech's data but did the opposite) and EPA's review, as well as the 
criminal sentencing of two Tetra Tech supervisors, there can be no doubt that massive 
fraud took place throughout the shipyard. 
It may be understandable that the Navy wants to soft-peddle the fraud, as they 
could have and should have prevented it and once suspicions arose they could have 
and should have conducted a competent investigation. The Navy's approach has been 
characterized by a long-running failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the fraud 
and its impact on the cleanup. 
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The Draft Plan continues this failure. For example, the Draft Plan claims that 
there is uncertainty about the sampling and data fraud, stating, "Allegations of 
previous sample collection fraud, improper sample and document custody/controls, 
and data manipulation could indicate that contamination was potentially left at the 
site" (p. iii).But, as stated above, the whistleblowers have sworn they participated in 
massive fraud under oath. "Could indicate" is inaccurate. Their testimony proves 
without doubt that significant contamination was left at the site un-remediated and that 
improperly remediated soil may have contaminated sites that had not previously been 
tainted. This needs to be investigated in Parcel G and the other places Tetra Tech 
worked. 
b. The Navy's Suggestion of Over-Remediation Is Sheer Speculation 
While characterizing proven facts as uncertainties, the Navy indulges in pure 
speculation, making the astonishing assertion that, "[t]he previous work relied on a 
quicker, less accurate method for analyzing radium-226 (226Ra). This method was 
known by stakeholders at the time to be biased high. A large amount of soil (estimated 
80 percent) was likely mischaracterized as contaminated (Argonne National 
Laboratory, 2011)." 
In other words, the Navy now claims that notwithstanding the fraud, things 
aren't as bad as they seem. 80% of the soil characterized as contaminated wasn't! 
Never mind that the alleged stakeholders are not identified and the Navy offers 
no evidence of agreement among them. Never mind that the Argonne National 
Laboratory report cited has not been made available to the public by the Navy so we 
cannot test this dubious assertion. 
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Similarly, the body of the Draft Plan claims the onsite lab was biased high: "In 
addition, the onsite laboratory used a screening method2 to analyze radium-226 
(226Ra) that may have reported at levels higher than actual radioactivity. TtEC 
presented CSMs in removal action completion reports that were based on potentially 
falsified data and screening results for 226Ra reported by the onsite laboratory (results 
were often biased high)." 
Footnote 2 states: 
"Analytical results for 226Ra were reported by the onsite laboratory using a 
screening method based on the 186 kiloelectron volt (ke V) energy peak. The 
offsite laboratory analyzed 226Ra using a definitive method (EPA 901.1 
comparable method), allowing the soil samples to equilibrate (21-day in-
growth) and reported concentrations using the 609 keV energy peak for 
bismuth-214 (214Bi) because 214Bi is in secular equilibrium with 226Ra. 
Comparisons between the onsite laboratory screening results and the offsite 
laboratory definitive results for 226Ra demonstrate the onsite laboratory results 
were consistently biased high. The 226Ra analytical results from the onsite 
laboratory resulted in false exceedances of the RGs, which resulted in the 
initiation of remediation. Remediation may have been avoided had soil 
samples been allowed to equilibrate (21-day in-growth) and decisions had been 
based on the more reliable 214Bi analysis using the 609 keV energy peak." 
In other words, the Navy claims it over-remediated for radium-226 in 80% of 
the remediated soil. This assertion inadvertently illustrates the Navy's conundrum. 
Either it wasted millions upon millions of dollars to clean up contaminated soil that 
wasn't really contaminated or the Conceptual Site Model on which the Draft Plan rests 
is demonstrably wrong. Either serves as an acknowledgement of the Navy's technical 
incompetence and the waste of time and money that resulted from it. 
The Navy's claim the onsite laboratory method was improperly biased is 
hardly reassuring. The Navy itself approved the laboratory methods. If the Navy fmds 
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fault with the methods now, it only has itself to blame. How many years did it rely on 
methods whose results it wants to explain away? 
Additionally, the Navy acknowledges the method was "quicker." The Navy 
must address whether the method it now disowns was wholly or partially selected 
because it was faster than others to speed production. This would substantiate the 
whistleblowers testimony. 
Although the Navy disparages the onsite laboratory method, the Draft Plan is 
so imprecise it does not actually state that this method will not be used in future. Nor 
does it specify what better methods will be used 
The Work Plan is also imprecise when it comes to determining the background 
level ofradium-226. The text of the plan never suggests that any other radionuclide 
than bismuth could be used as a substitute for radium. Only delving into the footnotes 
to Table 3-6 does one discover the Navy may also use lead-214, either with bismusth-
214 or standing alone. And yet, while the Navy at least attempts to demonstrate the 
bismuth equivalency, it does not even bother as to lead-214. It must. 
Despite what the Plan implies by describing the radium-226 method it intends 
to use as "definitive," the Navy admits it will not use an approved EPA method. 
Rather, it will use an unspecified "comparable" method. If the Navy relies on this 
"comparable" method, it must identify it and demonstrate that it is, indeed, 
comparable. 
c. The Nayy Should not Speculate About Sources of Radioactivity 
The Navy claims that a third uncertainty is: "[t]he RGs used previously are 
within background ranges. Therefore, soil that was considered contaminated could 
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have been attributable to naturally occurring radioactivity or anthropogenic fallout 
(Argonne National Laboratory, 2011)." The Navy should either report data to 
demonstrate that naturally occurring radioactivity or fallout impact the cleanup rather 
than speculate that it "could have been." 
In addition, Table 2-1 needs to be corrected. For example, under "current 
status" it says, "All known sources removed by Navy using standards at the time. 
Follow-up investigations resulted in removal of small volumes of soil to meet current 
RGs." However, the "follow up investigations" are left undescribed, not even saying 
how many "investigations" were conducted, let alone who conducted them. Nor do are 
the "results" that prompted additional remediation reported. Similarly, Table 2-1 
states, "Trench excavations that have been backfilled now contain homogenized soil 
from onsite fill, offsite fill, or a mixture of both." This statement ignores the certainty 
that "onsite fill" may have still contained levels of contaminants exceeding the RGs 
when it was used as fill, the result of fraudulent soil scanning. Table 2-1 also is 
consistent with the rest of the Draft Plan in the way it minimizes the fraud; the only 
reference to it is, "Potential for data manipulation or falsification." 
Again, the witness testimony and the Navy's and EPA's data reviews prove 
that the data falsification was real and extensive, not "potential." 
D. Section 3 - The Soil Investigation Design and Implementation Is 
Inadequate 
1. Data Quality Objectives 
Section 3.1 ofthe Draft Plan states,"[t]he primary objective is to determine 
whether site conditions are compliant with the Parcel G ROD RAO (Navy, 2009)" 
(p.3-1). 
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Step 5 of Section 3.1 indicates that if RGs are exceeded, "then the data will be 
evaluated to determine whether site conditions are protective of human health using 
USEPA's current guidance on Radiation Risk Assessment at Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Sites (USEP A, 
2014). A Removal Site Evaluation Report will be developed to include 
recommendations for further action." 
RGs are set precisely to be ''protective of human health." The Navy does not 
explain why it intends to conduct this additional risk assessment rather than do what is 
called for: remediate all soil and buildings that exceed the RGs. Given the history of 
the remediation and the approach of the Draft Plan, it is difficult not to conclude that 
this is yet another attempt to minimize the problem, and thus minimize the 
remediation necessary for free release. 
Step 6 of Section 3.1 states: "If any 226Ra gamma spectroscopy concentration 
is greater than the RG for 226Ra, then the soil sample will be analyzed for 238U and 
226Ra using comparable analytical methods (e.g., alpha spectrometry for 238U and 
radon emanation for 226Ra). For that specific sample, the 238U alpha spectrometry 
result will be used as a more representative estimate of the background value for 
226Ra, and the alpha spectrometry comparable result for 226Ra will be compared to 
the RG for 226Ra using the revised background value" (p.vi). In other words, the 
calculation of radium background levels depends on the uranium results. 
However, the Navy has offered insufficient validation data for this switch. Its 
explanation for why uranium background levels provide more reliable data on radium 
background is unconvincing. Even assuming substituting uranium for radium is 
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appropriate, the Navy offers no evidence that uranium-238 alpha spectroscopy 
provides "a more representative estimate of the background value of 226Ra" than Ra-
226 gamma spectroscopy. If that is the case, the Navy should provide the evidence. 
In addition, as stated, there is evidence that the shipyard was impacted by 
uranium. Thus, it must be included in the list of ROCs. As an ROC, it should not be 
the basis for calculating background levels of any other ROC. 
Step 7 of Section 3.1 reiterates the Executive Summary's admission the Navy 
has no intention to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. This subject will be addressed 
in comments below. Section 3.1 also repeats the phrase "man-made background," an 
issue already addressed above. (See Section IVB.) 
Section 3.2 addresses Radionuclides of Concern. As stated above, the list of 
ROCs must be augmented to reflect what is now known about the radionuclides that 
impacted the shipyard. The Navy must add instruments that can identify alpha and 
beta radiation, as needed, to investigate the presence of the expanded list of ROCs. 
Section 3.4 describes the design of the radiological investigation. It states, 
"[t]he radiological investigation design is primarily based on methods, techniques, and 
instrument systems in the Basewide Radiological Management Plan (TtEC, 2012)." 
Like the Argonne National Laboratory reference, this Management Plan was not 
provided by the Navy even though it is relied on by the Draft Plan. 
Sections 3.44 through 3.7 address the proposed two-phase approach to soil 
sampling. As argued below, this approach is further evidence the Navy will jettison 
the commitments made publicly to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. Phase I must be 
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applied to 100% of the sites Tetra Tech worked on rather than mere fractions of them. 
If that is done, Phase II must be reconsidered. 
Section 3.5, on instrumentation, must be augmented to account for an 
expanded list of ROCs to include equipment that can investigate alpha and beta 
radiation as well as gamma. 
In numerous places, the Draft Plan indicates scanning will be done with 
sodium iodide (N ai) detectors. (See, for example, Section 3. 5 .1.) However there is no 
justification for using Nai detectors when there are more sensitive instruments 
available. High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors are an alternative that are much 
more sensitive than other hand held instruments, for example. The Draft Plan should 
discuss what equipment was considered and should state the reasons for the selection. 
Section 3.6 describes the radiological investigation implementation. It starts by 
listing the seven types of subcontractors that will provide support services. There is an 
eighth that must be added: a verification subcontractor to observe and videotape the 
other contractors, particularly those doing sampling and scanning, to assure there is no 
possibility of fraud in future. Greenaction strongly urges the Navy to require that any 
verification contractor hire and train residents of the Bayview Hunters Point 
communities for this purpose. This will serve three positive goals: preventing fraud; 
providing jobs; and building trust; approaching fraud prevention in a way that relies on 
local community members and can, in turn, inform and build trust among the broader 
public. 
Furthermore, the training plan is deficient in in that it perpetuates the Navy's 
minimization of the fraud. Nowhere does the Draft Plan require that all contractors' 
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personnel be informed of the types of fraud Tetra Tech committed, that improper 
practices will not be tolerated and they will be observed and videotaped to assure the 
integrity of the investigation. 
2. Phase I Soil 
The Navy claims that, "[a] phased investigation approach is presented in this 
work plan that was designed to provide a high level of confidence that current site 
conditions either comply or do not comply with the Parcel G ROD RAO (Navy, 
2009)" (p. iv). We hope the Navy considers public comments and significantly alters 
the plan to provide a basis for that confidence. To the contrary, the current plan 
undermines it. 
If the history of the Tetra Tech fraud and the Navy's complicity in it teaches 
anything, it is that the Navy has always been overconfident. It was confident Tetra 
Tech could investigate itself. It was confident in the accuracy of Tetra Tech's false 
conclusion that the fraud was narrowly limited. It was confident the whistleblowers 
were mistaken or lying. It was confident the data review would validate Tetra Tech's 
data. In each case, the Navy was wrong, its confidence was unwarranted. 
The public cannot be confident the Draft Plan will provide adequate data to 
demonstrate compliance with the ROD. First, as mentioned, the Navy does not plan to 
even test substantial amounts of soil. 
The Navy will not find contamination it refuses to look for. All trench and 
survey units and any other work or locations worked on by Tetra Tech must be 
sampled. 
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The Draft Plan also is significantly deficiency in its lack of specificity about 
the handling of backfilled soil and soil excavated from side walls (and bottoms). If 
contaminated backfilled soil and side wall soil are mixed, previously uncontaminated 
soil may become contaminated. The Draft Plan must require that backfilled soil and 
side wall soil be segregated, scanned and cleared separately. 
Other problems also bedevil Phase I. The Draft Plan states, "The targeted TUs 
and SUs were selected based on the highest potential for radiological contamination," 
based on, "[h ]istorical documentation of specific potential upstream sources, spills, or 
other indicators of potential contamination," and "[s]igns of potential manipulation or 
falsification from the soil data evaluation" (p. iv). 
Again, the historical record on which the Draft Wok Plan relies is 
demonstrably wrong. Again, the Navy claims it will use the best data while 
simultaneously ignoring the best evidence available to it. 
Furthermore the Navy claims it can use signs of manipulation and falsification 
in the "soil data evaluation" of Tetra Tech's data to target Phase I resampling. That 
can only be true if the Navy ignores the EPA's review of the Parcel G soil data 
evaluation, which found 97% of the data to be suspect. Precisely how the Navy will 
use data that is 97% unreliable to target one-third of the trench units and half the 
survey units is left unexplained. 
The two factors the Navy claims it can use to narrow Phase I soil sampling are 
patently false. There is no rational basis stated in the Draft Plan on which to select 
samples sites with ''the highest potential for radiological contamination." 
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Furthermore, the Work Plan says the sanitary and storm water sewer systems 
"will be gamma scanned." Gamma scanning is necessary but insufficient. As 
discussed above, the number ofradionuclides of concern (ROCs) must be significantly 
expanded to account for the true historical evidence. Gamma scanning cannot identify 
all of the ROCs that should be included. Consequently, scanning for alpha and beta 
radiation will be necessary. 
3. Phase II Soil 
As stated, Phase II must be reconsidered in light of the changes necessary to 
Phase 1. However, assuming Phase II as described is relevant, the plan states that, 
"subsurface soil samples will be collected via borings. The borings will be advanced 
beyond the floor boundary of the trench or to the point of refusal. Gamma scans of the 
core will be conducted" (p. v.). 
Although the Navy agrees to excavate and scanlOO% of the soil from the sewer 
systems in Phase I, it plans no such comprehensive effort during Phase II. It does not 
even attempt to explain why. 
Borings alone are completely inadequate. They will not provide sufficiently 
comprehensive information to properly investigate the exceptional history of radiation 
contamination in Parcel G, including the likelihood that fraudulent practices resulted 
in contaminating soils and areas that were not previously contaminated. 
And, as mentioned, the plan to limit scanning to gamma radiation is 
inappropriate to the expanded number of ROCs an updated understanding of the 
historical record will identify. 
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E. Section 4 - Building Investigations 
"Buildings will be divided into SUs, and the size and boundary of the SUs will 
be based on the previous plans and reports" (p. v.) These "plans and reports" go 
unidentified. The Draft Plan must provide a factual rationale for the size and borders 
of the building SUs. 
The Draft Plan also states that only the interior of buildings will be scanned, 
but gives no rational basis for excluding exteriors. The Draft Plan must either include 
building exteriors or justify excluding them. 
In addition, according to Figure 4-1, building background reference samples 
will be taken from Building 401, a building that has been radiologically impacted. 
This location is apparently justified by the Navy's assertion that the first floor was not 
impacted. It defies the imagination that there is not a more suitable location. Perhaps 
from a building no part of which was ever impacted? Like many other portions of the 
Draft Plan there is a paucity of information, this time on the building background 
sample selection process. It should be fully described, including justification for the 
site or sites selected. 
Section 4.5.5 calls for portable survey instruments to be calibrated at least once 
a year. This is far too long a period to demonstrate to a distrustful community that data 
will be developed using properly calibrated instruments. The Navy should propose a 
shorter time period between calibrations and the rationale for its choice. 
F. Section 5- Data Evaluation and Reporting 
Section 5.2 states, "The effort expended during DQA should be consistent with 
the graded approach used to develop the survey design." The Navy should explain 
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what "graded approach" means. This section also contains an unnecessarily complex 
set of calculations to calculate equivalents of different units of measure. Subsection 
5.2.2.1 states, "The RGs for buildings surfaces (Table 4-2) are stated in units of 
dpm/100 cm2 [disintegration(s) per minute per 100 square centimeters]; however, 
alpha and beta static measurement results will be reported in units of counts during a 
specified counting interval, while scan measurement results will be reported in units of 
cpm [counts per minute]." The formula for conversion into dpm/100cm2 follows. The 
Navy fails to explain why it does not intend to report results as dpm/100cm2 in the 
first place. 
One glaring shortcoming of the Draft Plan evident throughout is the different 
treatment given to samples that exceed the RGs and those that do not. Samples below 
the RG are simply declared compliant with the ROD. No further investigation is called 
for. In sharp contrast, should a sample exceed an RG, it undergoes additional 
confirmation. For example, Section 5.2.3 says, "If all measurement or sample results 
from a TU/SU are below the corresponding radionuclide-specific RG values or 
corresponding investigation level values, the TU/SU complies with the Parcel G ROD 
RAO." But Section 5.3.2 states, "The first step in investigating potential areas of 
elevated activity is to confirm the measurement or sample results that indicated the 
potential area of elevated activity." A similar provision applies to buildings (See Draft 
Plan Section 4.1 ). 
We agree validation of sample results is essential. Why then is there no parallel 
requirement that any samples initially determined to be below the RGs undergo further 
investigation as well? It is equally likely that sample and analysis variability will result 
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in lower readings as higher ones. The difference in treatment is an example of how 
the Navy will go to some lengths to attempt to disprove an elevated reading while 
making no similar efforts to see if non-elevated readings could be just as wrong. 
Section 5.2 goes on to state, "In most cases, at least one measurement or 
sample result documenting the lack of elevated activity will be required to support a 
decision to terminate the investigation of a potential area of elevated activity." One of 
how many? If there are multiple samples that exhibit elevated activity but one that 
does not, is the decision to terminate the investigation justified? 
G. Section 7- Waste Management Plan 
Section 7.5 relates to compliance with CERCLA's Offsite Rule. It says "the 
contractor will request proof of Offsite Rule approval from the offsite disposal facility 
before transferring any wastes to an offsite facility." What it doesn't say is that the 
approval actually is granted and proof of it must be presented before the transfer. It 
must. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Draft Parcel G Work Plan is woefully deficient. It must be revised to 
incorporate these comments and those of other interested members ofthe community. 
If not, the community can add just another occasion to the many, many before it over 
the years that the Navy has lied to them. 
Laura Duchnak, director of the Navy's Base Realignment and Closure 
Program, acknowledged in writing in a victim-impact statement for the sentencing of 
one of Tetra Tech's supervisors that the community has lost all faith in the Navy's 
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ability to do a proper cleanup. The distressing deficiencies in the Draft Plan and the 
comer-cutting evident in it, only deepen distrust. 
The Draft Pian must be wholly reworked so that all of the sites Tetra Tech 
worked on will be fully resampled, as the Navy promised. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steven J Castleman 
Visiting Associate Professor & Staff Attorney 
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic 
415-442-6675 I scastleman@,ggu.edu 
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